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Abstract
This paper presents the "isolate first, then share" OS model
in which the machine’s processor cores, memory, and devices
are divided up between disparate OS instances, and a new
abstraction—subOS—is proposed to encapsulate an OS in-
stance that can be created, destroyed, and resized on-the-fly.
The intuition is that this avoids shared kernel states between
applications, which in turn reduces performance loss caused
by contention. We decompose the OS into the supervisor and
several subOSes running at the same privilege level: a subOS
directly manages physical resources, while the supervisor can
create, destroy, resize a subOS on-the-fly. The supervisor and
subOSes have few state sharing, but fast inter-subOS commu-
nication mechanisms are provided on demand.
We present the first implementation—RainForest, which
supports unmodified Linux binaries. Our comprehensive eval-
uation shows RainForest outperforms Linux with four differ-
ent kernels, LXC, and Xen in terms of worst-case and aver-
age performance most of time when running a large number
of benchmarks. The source code is available from deleted for
double-blind review.
1. Introduction
The shift toward datacenter computing (in short, DC), e.g.,
warehouse-scale computing [12, 11] and cloud comput-
ing [87, 85, 5, 71, 59, 67] calls for the new OS architecture.
On one hand, previous joint work between academia and
industry [55] shows modern DC workloads are with signif-
icant diversity in workload behavior with no single silver-
bullet application to optimize for and with no major intra-
application hotspots. On the other hand, modern DC work-
loads have differentiated QoS requirements in terms of the
average or worst-case performance. As a notable emerging
class of workloads, user-facing services require very low tail
latency [27, 56, 50]—worst-case performance—instead of av-
erage performance on each node. When a latency-critical
workload is mixed with others, if the OS can not improve
tail latency, the resource utilization will be low. Meanwhile,
many other workloads face the scalability challenges in terms
of average performance [94, 39, 44, 68, 81, 25, 14].
This observation has two implications for the OS research
efforts. First, it is no longer possible to tackle this challenge
in an ad-hoc manner by repeatedly identifying and removing
the bottlenecks [94, 39, 44, 68, 81]. Second, even we can
optimize the OS for the main classes of workloads, if they
require different kernel changes, there is no guarantee that
the changes will compose [16].
Traditional OS architectures are mainly proposed for the
average performance [82, 41, 22, 47, 7, 10]. The widely used
Linux, Linux container (LXC) [7], or Xen [10], adopt mono-
lithic kernels or virtual machine monitor (VMM) that share
numerous data structures protected by locks (share first), and
then a process or virtual machine (VM) is proposed to guar-
antee performance isolation (then isolate). In the rest of this
paper, we call this kind of OS architectures "share first, then
isolate" (in short, SFTI). In addition to its ad-hoc manner
by repeatedly identifying and removing the (average) perfor-
mance bottlenecks, the SFTI OS architecture has its inherent
structure obstacle in achieving the worst-case performance:
contending shared structures in the kernel deteriorates perfor-
mance outliers. Previous state-of-the-art systems have mainly
focused on improving the scalability of the existing model
in terms of the average performance (e.g., sv6 [25], Bar-
relFish [14]), or on tackling tail latency reduction challenges
(e.g., IX [17], Arrakis [79]).
Our goal is to build a new OS architecture that not only
gracefully achieves disparate performance goals in terms of
both average and worst-case performance, but also protects
software investment. While previous work done on exok-
ernels [79, 14, 17, 16, 19] offers interesting alternative ap-
proaches to either scalability or tail latency reduction chal-
lenges, monolithic kernels are commercially significant [7],
especially for DC workloads.
This paper presents an "isolate first, then share" (in short,
IFTS) OS model guided by three design principles: elastic OS
instance; run at the same privilege level; and confined state
supervisor
Resource
provision
subOS
(resource principal)
Trusted
computing
base
Physical
partitions
Traditional OS abstractions
(thread, process, container)
CPU Mem Dev CPU Mem Dev
Hardware
CPU Mem
User level
interfaces
Security
guard
Mgmt
services
Security
guard
User space
Kernel space
Trusted
computing
base
Security
guard
Figure 1: The IFTS OS architecture.
sharing. We divide up the machine’s processor cores, mem-
ory, and devices among disparate OS instances, and propose a
new OS abstraction—subOS—encapsulating an OS instance
that can be created, destroyed, and resized on the fly (elastic
OS instance); We decompose the OS into the supervisor and
subOSes running at the same privilege level: a subOS directly
manages physical resources and runs applications, while the
supervisor enables resource sharing through creating, destroy-
ing, resizing a subOS on-the-fly; The supervisor and subOSes
have few state sharing, but fast inter-subOS communication
mechanisms based on shared memory and IPIs are provided
on demand (confined state sharing). As the supervisor and
subOSes run in the same privilege level, we take a software
approach to enforce security isolation. We propose Secu-
rity Guard (in short SG)—an added kernel module in both
the supervisor and each subOS kernel space utilizing the mu-
tual protection of Instrumentation-based Privilege Restriction
(IPR) and Address Space Randomization (ASR) [28]. IPR in-
tercepts the specified privileged operations in the supervisor
or subOS kernels and transfers these operations to SG, while
ASR hides SG in the address space from the supervisor or su-
bOS kernels, which is demonstrated to be secure with trivial
overhead [28].
On several Intel Xeon platforms, we applied the IFTS OS
model to build the first working prototype—RainForest on
the basis of Linux 2.6.32. Figure 1 shows the IFTS OS archi-
tecture. Our current implementation does not include safety
isolation. We performed comprehensive evaluation of Rain-
Forest against four Linux kernels: 1) 2.6.32; 2) 3.17.4; 3)
4.9.40; 4) 2.6.35M, a modified version of 2.6.35 integrated
with sloppy counters [20]; LXC (version 0.7.5 ); XEN (ver-
sion 4.0.0). Our comprehensive evaluations show RainForest
outperforms Linux with four different kernels, LXC, and Xen
in terms of worst-case and average performance most of time
when running a large number of benchmarks.
2. Related Work
RainForest not only gracefully achieves disparate perfor-
mance goals in terms of both average and worst-case per-
formance, but also protects software investments. The closest
system is Solaris/Sparc [3], which runs multiple OS instances.
The firmware hypervisor beneath logical domains runs in an
additional hyper-privileged mode, and it handles all hyper-
privileged requests from logical domains via hypervisor APIs.
While in RainForest, the supervisor and several subOSes run
at the same privilege level, and a subOS directly manages re-
sources without the intervention from the supervisor. Figure 2
performs the structural comparison of RainForest with other
related systems.
Most of previous systems focus on the average perfor-
mance. First, much previous work scales the existing mono-
lithic OSes to accommodate many processors in an ad-hoc
manner [94, 39, 44, 68, 81]. Focusing on how to reduce shar-
ing for shared-memory systems, Tornado [34] and K42 [61]
introduce clustered objects to optimize data sharing through
the balance of partitioning and replication. Resource contain-
ers/LXC [7] separates a protection domain from a resource
principal but shares the same structure of a monolithic ker-
nel.
Second, microkernels [32, 13, 38, 31, 29] move most ker-
nel management into user space services, but globally-shared
data structures exist in kernel components. SawMill [35],
Mach-US [53], Pebble [33], and MINIX [46] decompose
the OS into a set of user-level servers executing on the
globally-shared microkernel, and leverage a set of services
to obtain and manage resources locally. A recent system—
Tessellation [26] factors OS services and implements them
in user space (similar to fos [99]). For the multi-server
OSes [35, 53, 33, 46], the OS is decomposed into several
servers or services with complex dependencies, which ampli-
fies the performance outliers in serving a user-facing request.
In addition, multi-server OSes have a globally-shared micro-
kernel, while each subOS in RainForest runs independently
most of time.
Third, OS functionalities of an exokernel [30] are pushed to
library OSes linked with individual user-level processes. The
globally-shared kernel still controls the access of low-level re-
sources, handles scheduling, interrupts, and exceptions, and
delivers network packets. Corey [19] resembles an exokernel
which defines a shared abstraction that allows applications to
dynamically create lookup tables of kernel objects and deter-
mine how these tables are shared.
Fourth, there are a number of other ways to build virtual-
ization systems, which range from the hardware (e.g., IBM
LPARs [51]) up to the full software, including hardware ab-
straction layer VMs (e.g., Xen [10]), operating system layer
VMs (e.g., LXC/Docker [7, 69], VServer [88]), and hosted
VMs (e.g., KVM) [58]. In Xen, even physical resources are
directly allocated to a VM, it still needs VMM intervention
for privileged operations and exceptions handling. Differ-
ently, in RainForest, the machine’s cores, memory, and de-
vices are divided up among subOSes, and the supervisor and
OSes run at the same privilege level. Recursive virtual ma-
chines [32, 37] [102] allow OSes to be decomposed verti-
cally by implementing OS functionalities in stackable VMMs.
Disco and Cellular Disco [40, 21] use virtual machines to
scale commodity multi-processor OSes. VirtuOS [75] ex-
ploits virtualization to isolate and protect vertical slices of
existing OS kernels. Unikernels [67] are single-purpose ap-
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Figure 2: Structural comparison of RainForest with related systems.
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Figure 3: 3a shows the cumulative latency distribution of mmap from Will-it-scale [4] on a 12-core server. (x, y) indicates y
processes running on x cores. 3b shows the tail latency of Search is slowed down n times (in the Y axis) when co-located with
each background PARSEC benchmark. The tail latency of Search at 300 req/s on a 12-core server with four Linux kernels is 108.6,
134.5, 127.7 ms, 138.1 ms, respectively.
pliances that are compile-time specialized into standalone
kernels and sealed against modification when deployed to a
cloud platform.
Finally, a number of systems reconstruct the traditional OS
as a distributed system: either base on hardware partition-
ing [3], or view the OS states as replicated [14, 84, 15, 8,
86, 54, 77], or span an OS across multiple cache-coherence
domains [65] or hardware accelerators [74], or restrict the
management functions of the hypervisor [57, 90]. BarrelFish
reconstructs the OS as a peer-to-peer distributed system built
on exokernels, whose states are strictly synchronized via mes-
sage passing among all CPU drivers on each core. Pop-
corn [9] constructs a single system image on top of multi-
ple Linux kernels (each runs on a different ISA) through a
compiler framework, making applications run transparently
amongst different ISA processors. Differently, the IFTS OS
model lets applications running on different subOSes to avoid
the cost of sharing if they do not intend to do so. In addition,
the supervisor is in charge of resource management, while
each subOS can be created, destroyed, and resized on the fly.
Focusing on tail latency reduction, the recent two operat-
ing systems, Arrakis [79, 14], and IX [17, 16] make appli-
cations directly access virtualized and physical I/O devices
through customized service servers and libos, respectively,
so as to speed up network-intensive workloads. The subOS
abstraction is orthogonal to the existing OS abstraction like
DUNE/IX, and we can integrate the DUNE/IX module into
subOSes specifically running latency-critical workloads, as
the latter is a monolithic Linux kernel. Other tail-latency tol-
erant systems [56, 63, 64, 49, 97, 80, 103] tackle this chal-
lenges from perspective of architecture or middleware, or
scheduling policy.
Other related work includes performance isolation solu-
tions [95, 87, 43, 36], using queuing policies or resource allo-
cation algorithms, and resource accountability [23, 85, 5].
3. Motivation
In this section, the hardware and software configurations are
consistent with that in Section 6 accordingly.
3.1. Tail latency reduction challenge
Figure 3a shows on a recent Linux kernel (4.9.40) the cumu-
lative distribution of latencies of a simple micro-benchmark—
mmap (the average is about few microseconds) from the Will-
it-scale benchmark suite [4] on a 12-core server. This bench-
mark creates multiple processes, each creating a 128M file
and then repeatedly mapping and unmapping it into and from
the memory. On the same number of cores, we have the fol-
lowing observation: as the process number increases, tail la-
tency significantly deteriorates. It is mainly because of fre-
quent accesses on a global variable vm_commited_as pro-
tected by a spinlock. vm_commited_as is a percpu_counter
and should streamline concurrent updates by using the lo-
cal counter in vm_commited_as. But once the update is be-
yond the percpu_counter_batch limit, it will overflow into the
global count, causing false sharing and high synchronization
overhead. Our experiments show similar trends in other Will-
It-Scale benchmarks (e.g., pagefault, malloc).
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3.2. Performance interferences of co-located workloads
Figure 3b measures the deterioration of the tail latency of
Search—a search engine workload from the BigDataBench
benchmark suite [98] (its average latency is about tens or hun-
dreds of milliseconds) co-located with each PARSEC work-
load [2] on a 12-core server running four kernels: 2.6.32,
2.6.35M [20], 3.17.4, and 4.9.40. Although consolidation
increases the resource utilization, the tail latency is slowed
down tens of times, which is unacceptable for large-scale ser-
vices. Even we fix CPU affinities for Search and PARSEC
processes and specify the local allocate memory allocation
policy, the tail latency is maximally slowed down by above
forty times.
3.3. Root cause discussion
The literatures [64, 20, 39] conclude the microscopic reasons
for the performance outliers residing on both software and
hardware levels: (1) contention for shared locks, i.e., locks for
virtual memory operations, process creation and etc.; (2) com-
peting for software resources, such as caches, lists, and etc.;
(3) other in-kernel mechanisms like scheduling and timers;
(4) micro-architecture events for consistency, such as TLB
shootdown, cache snooping, etc.; and (5) competing limited
hardware capacities, such as bandwidth.
We can contribute most of the microscopic reasons (1, 2,
4) to the SFTI architectures that share resources and states
from bottom to up. Since the computers are embracing ex-
traordinary densities of hardware and DC workloads become
increasingly diverse, large scale and sensitive to interferences,
we believe it is the right time to reconstruct the OS.
4. The IFTS OS Model
The IFTS OS model is guided by three design principles.
4.1. Elastic OS instance
In the IFTS OS model, the machine’s cores, memory, and
devices are divided up between disparate OS instances. We
propose subOS as a new OS abstraction that encapsulates an
OS instance. Subject to the hardware architecture, each su-
bOS may include at least a CPU core or SMT (Simultaneous
Multi-Treading) thread (if supported), a memory region at a
fine or coarse granularity, and optionally several peripherals.
This "isolate first" approach lets applications avoid the cost
of sharing if they do not intend to do so. Instead, in a system
with global sharing of kernel structures, processes contend
with each other for limited resources, such as dentry cache,
inode cache, page cache, and even routing table. Note that
we do not preclude subOSes sharing memory between cores
(see Section 4.3). On the other hand, hardware units like TLB
entries are no longer necessarily shared by subOSes, and TLB
shootdown is unnecessary to broadcast to all cores.
Physically partitioning node resources among subOSes
makes resource sharing much difficult. To overcome this limi-
tation, we allow creating, destroying and resizing a subOS on
the fly, which we call elastic OS instance. This is an impor-
tant extension to reflect the requirements of DC computing.
Their workloads often change significantly in terms of both
load levels and resource demands, so an IFTS OS needs to
adjust the subOS number or resize each subOS’s resources.
This property not only facilitates flexible resource sharing,
but also supports shrinking durations of rental periods and
increasingly fine grained resources offered for sale [5].
Most of server workloads are fast changing, e.g., their ra-
tios of peak loads to normal loads are high. So resizing
a subOS must be fast or else it will result in significant
QoS violation or throughput loss. Experiences show the fea-
sibility of hot-adding or hot-plugging a physical device in
Linux [73, 83, 62] or decoupling cores from the kernel in Bar-
relfish/DC [101]. We can further shorten the long path of
initializing or defunctioning the physical resource from the
ground up in existing approaches as discussed in Section 5.
Resource overcommitment increases hardware utilization
in VMM as most VMs use only a small portion of the physi-
cal memory that is allocated to them. Similarly, an IFTS OS
allows resource preemption among subOSes. For example, a
subOS preempts cores of others if its load is much heavier.
Latency critical workloads with a higher priority definitely
benefit from resource preemption when mixed with offline
batches.
SubOS is the main abstraction in our IFTS OSmodel. First,
the subOS abstraction makes resource accounting much accu-
rate. A subOS owns exclusive resources, independently runs
applications, and shares few states with others, which clears
up the confusion of attributing resource consumptions to ap-
plications because of scheduling, interrupt serving, peripheral
drivers and etc.
Second, the subOS abstraction is proposed as an OS man-
agement facility. We can flexibly provision physical re-
sources through creating, destroying, or resizing a subOS.
From this perspective, the subOS abstraction is orthogonal
to the existing OS abstractions proposed for resource man-
agement, i.e. the resource container [7], and the DUNE/IX
abstraction [16, 17].
Third, two subOSes can establish internal communica-
tion channels, which resembles inter-process communication
(IPC) in a monolithic OS. A subOS can map a memory zone
of another subOS to enable shared memory like mmap in
Linux.
4.2. Run at the same privilege level
We decompose the OS into the supervisor and several sub-
OSes running at the same privilege level: the supervisor dis-
covers, monitors, and provisions resources, while each subOS
independently manages resources and runs applications.
The roles of the supervisor and subOSes are explicitly dif-
ferentiated. The supervisor gains a global view of the ma-
chine’s physical resources and allocates resources for a su-
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Table 1: Shared states compared among different operating systems.
System Structures protected by locks Shared software resources Micro-architecture level
Linux dentry re f erence, v f smount, vm_commited_as,
etc. [20]
dentry, inode,
v f smount table, etc. [20]
Events across all cores: TLB shoot-
down, LLC snooping, etc.
Linux containers Locks in kernel and introduced by cgroups, i.e.,
page_cgroup lock [6], request-queue lock [48]
Same as Linux Events across all cores: same as Linux;
cache conflict in cgroups subsystems
Xen/VMM file locks [76], many spin-locks operations [104],
etc.
Xenstore, a shared translation
array, event channels, etc. [10]
Events across all cores: same as Linux.
IX Locks in Linux kernel and user space driver None (Static allocation) Events across all cores
Barrelfish/Arakis All states are globally consistent through one-
phase or two-phase commit protocol [14]
None Events are limited in a single core
RainForest Resource Descriptions of a subOS (lock-free) None Events are limited within a subOS
bOS. A subOS initializes and drives the resources on its own
and creates other high-level OS abstractions for better re-
source sharing within a subOS, e.g., process, thread, and re-
source container. A subOS becomes more efficient not only
because of minimum involvement from the supervisor, but
also because it knows resource management better than the
supervisor. In addition, the transient failure of the supervisor
or the other subOSes will not lead to the failure of the subOS,
vice versa.
However, threats come from the bugs and vulnerabilities
within the kernel of the supervisor or subOSes. Since the
subOS or supervisor kernel has the highest privilege, attack-
ers who compromise the kernel could manipulate the under-
lying hardware state by executing privileged operations. To
avoid such threat, we take a software approach and propose
SG—an added kernel module in both the supervisor and each
subOS kernel space—which utilizes the mutual protection
of Instrumentation-based Privilege Restriction (IPR) and Ad-
dress Space Randomization (ASR) [28] to enforce security
isolation among the supervisor and subOS kernels. ASR is
a lightweight approach to randomize the code and data lo-
cations of SG in the supervisor and subOSes kernels to en-
sure their locations impossible to guess in the virtual address
space, thus preventing the adversary who has knowledge of
the memory locations from subverting them. Through IPR,
we can intercept the specified privileged operations in the ker-
nel and transfer them to SG in the same privilege level.
SG in each subOS kernel maps the resource descriptions
of each subOS into its own address space as read-only. And
only SG in the supervisor kernel has the right to modify it.
SG only needs to read the descriptions to check the legality
of privileged operations in the kernel. On one hand, it inter-
cepts the operation like mov− to− cr3 and page table update
to refrain the supervisor and subOSes from accessing invalid
physical address space. On the other hand, it intercepts the
sensitive interrupt instructions, e.g., HALT and start-up IPI.
Besides, intercepting the IOMMU configuration is essential
if we need guarantee DMA isolation and interrupt safety.
As the code size of SG is small, we consider it as trusted
computing base (TCB) while the other kernel code and user-
space applications are untrusted. The integrity of TCB can be
ensured using the authenticated boot provided by the platform
module (TPM) [42].
4.3. Confined state sharing
In the IFTS OS model, the supervisor and subOSes have
few state sharing, but fast inter-subOS communication mech-
anisms are provided on demand.
Physically partitioning node resources inherently reduces
the sharing scope inside a subOS. Within a subOS, soft-
ware operations like lock/unlock and micro-architectural op-
erations like TLB shootdown and cache synchronization will
thus happen within a smaller scope. Meanwhile, the traffic
through system interconnects will also decline. However, ex-
tremely restricting a subOS onto a single core is probably not
the best option. Applications may expect for a different num-
ber of cores and thread-to-core mappings [92].
Inter-subOS state sharing is kept on a very low level. It is
ideal that no state is shared among subOSes. But the hard-
ware trend towards high density and fast interconnection ac-
celerates intra-node data exchange. And the supervisor has to
communicate with subOSes for coordination. On one hand,
we demand the data structures shared by the supervisor and
all subOSes are quite limited. As resource management is
locally conducted by subOS kernels, global coordination and
monitoring enforced by the supervisor are much reduced. On
the other hand, we facilitate two subOSes to construct mu-
tual communication channels on demand. In this context, the
negative effects of frequent updates in the communication are
neutralized by a small sharing degree. It also makes sense
in the scenario that the supervisor transfers messages to a su-
bOS for dynamic resource reconfiguration. The IFTS model
encourages making a tradeoff of resource sharing within a su-
bOS and among subOSes, which gains the best performance
for typical server workloads, e.g., the Spark workload as
shown in Section 6.4.2.
Table 1 summarizes RainForest’s state sharing reduced
against other systems, including Linux, XEN, LXC, Bar-
relFish/Arrakis, and IX. We investigated the shared states in-
side an OS from three aspects: contention for shared locks,
competing software resources, and micro-architecture events
for consistency. We can see that only RainForest has the least
shared states and the micro-architecture events are within a
subOS. As for the communication channels between two su-
bOSes, they are established on demand and the shared struc-
tures do not have influence on other subOSes.
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Table 2: Hardware configurations of two servers.
Type S-A S-B
CPU Intel Xeon E5645 Intel Xeon E7-8870
Number of cores 6 cores@2.4GHz 10 cores@2.4GHz
Number of threads 12 20
Sockets 2 4
L3 Cache 12 MB 30 MB
DRAM capacity 32 GB, DDR3 1 TB, DDR3
NICs 8 Intel 82580 ethernet 1000Mb/s
HDDs 8 Seagate 1TB 7200RPM, 64MB cache
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Figure 4: The structure of RainForest.
5. The Implementation
We explore the implications of these principles by describing
the implementation of the RainForest OS, which is not the
only way to apply the IFTS OS model.
5.1. Targeted platforms
In this paper, we focus on applying the IFTS OS model on
a cc-NUMA (cache-coherent non-uniform memory architec-
ture) server with a single PCIe root complex. On such server,
we assume there are abundant physical resources divided up
among subOSes. Table 2 shows the configuration details of
two different servers: a mainstream 12-core server (S-A) and
a near-future mainstream server with 40 cores and 1 TB mem-
ory (S-B). In the rest of this paper, the performance numbers
are reported on these servers.
5.2. System structure
Figure 4 depicts the RainForest structure. In our current im-
plementation, the supervisor is the first OS instance on each
machine occupying at least one core or SMT thread and sev-
eral MB of memory.
FICM (Fast Inter-subOS CommunicationMeachnism) pro-
vides the basic interfaces for inter-subOS communication.
FICM forks low-level message channels among subOSes
based on inter-processor interrupt (IPI) and shared memory.
A core is selected as the communication core in a subOS. On
each subOS, we fork two FICM kernel threads (read/write)
with real time priority to transfer tiny immediate messages
in units of cache lines (typically 64 Bytes) using NAPI inter-
faces (New API, which combines interrupts and polling). It
supports unicast, multicast, and broadcast operations. Upon
FICM, supcon in the supervisor and subOScon in a subOS
implement the primitives command of subOS management,
respectively. Primitive commands issued from one end will
be conducted and handled by the other. Resource provisioner
Customized trampolineCommon trampoline
Physical
memory ......
Virtual
address
space
__PAGE_OFFSET
0
......
__START_KERNEL_map
Kernel text
subOS private memory
A large
memory hole
New __PHYS
ICAL_START
Figure 5: Physical memory and virtual memory organizations
of a subOS.
provides management interfaces for a full-fledged user space
management tool—rfm. Currently, the functions of Resource
provisioner and supcon are implemented into a kernel module
named RFcontroller.
5.3. SubOS management
Memory organization: Figure 5 summarizes the organiza-
tions of physical and virtual memory spaces of a subOS.
Conventionally, Linux directly maps all physical memory
from zero to PAGE_OFFSET so that the conversion between
virtual and physical addresses can be easily carried out by
macros __pa and __va. In a subOS, we map the start address
of its physical memory to PAGE_OFFSET and rephrase the
__pa and __va macros. Other fix-mapped structures, which
are mostly architecture-specific, are revised to create a safe
booting environment. To support logical hot-add and hot-
plug of memory regions whose physical addresses are ahead
of the ones that are initially allocated to a subOS, we map
them into a hole after __START_KERNEL_map in the address
space instead of the direct-mapping address space starting
from PAGE_OFFSET.
Creating a subOS: Before starting a subOS, RFcontroller
prepares the least descriptions of hardware, upon which a su-
bOS can successfully start up. In the normal Linux booting,
it is actually conducted by BIOS. The information that RF-
controller fills for a subOS includes the description of SMP
(MPConfiguration Table), memory regions (E820 Table), and
boot parameters. A new bootparam parameter is added to in-
struct the kernel with a white list of passthrough PCIe end-
points. For the X86-64 architecture, we employ a two-phase
jump after RFcontroller issues a restart command to the desig-
nated BSP (Bootstrap Processor) of a subOS. Once finishing
the mode switch in the common trampoline in low memory,
the executionwill jump to the customized trampoline residing
in its exclusive physical memory.
Though in RainForest each subOS independently manages
its own physical resources, it still needs help from the supervi-
sor. It is because a few hardware resources must be accessed
via atomic operations or strictly protected from simultaneous
updates. A typical example is the low memory (< 1M) where
resides a small slice of trampoline code that is needed for any
X86 processor to finish mode switches. Similar situations ex-
ist in the management of I/O APIC pins and PCI configura-
tion registers. RainForest adopts global spinlocks stored in a
6
globally shared page that is mapped into the address spaces
of both the supervisor and subOSes. Please note that this pro-
tection is specific to the x86-64 architecture.
Resizing a subOS: Linux supports device hot-plug to al-
low failing hardware to be removed from a live system. How-
ever, the shortest path of functioning or defunctioning a de-
vice for elastic resource adjustment in a subOS is different
from failing over hardware failures. We made great effort to
shorten the path of logical hot-add and hot-plug by remov-
ing several unnecessary phases. For example, we reduce the
overhead of a CPU hot-add operation from 150 ms to 70 ms
by removing the delay calibration of each CPU. For a mem-
ory hot-add operation, we reduce the scope of scanning re-
movable page blocks through a short list recording the page
blocks reserved by the kernel.
In RainForest, every resource adjustment operation is
recorded by the supervisor, which can be further configured to
collect the running information through subOScon from the
proc subsystem. In particular, hardware performance coun-
ters can be accurately employed using the perf tools in a su-
bOS to monitor architectural events of its CPUs. Besides,
resource borrowing is allowed among subOSes but needs to
be registered on the supervisor via a specified command.
Destroying a subOS: A subOS releases all resources be-
fore sending a shutdown request to the supervisor. The super-
visor then prepares a designated trampoline program, forces
it to transfer the CPUs to the supervisor via the trampoline,
and finally reclaims other resources.
5.4. Communication subsystems
FICM is preferably used for light-weight messages. To meet
with different requirements of continuous and bulk communi-
cation, we introduce diverse communicating facilities includ-
ing RFcom, RFloop, and other virtualization infrastructures.
RFcom exports high-level interfaces to kernel routines and
user-space programs to facilitate inter-subOS communication.
They are rf_open, rf_close, rf_write, and rf_read, rf_map, and
rf_unmap. The former four interfaces operate on a socket-
like channel, upon which subOSes easily communicate with
packet messages. The other two interfaces help map and un-
map shared memory to individual address spaces, but without
explicit synchronization mechanisms.
RFloop creates a fully-transparent inter-subOS network
loop channel on the basis of Linux netfilter. Network pack-
ets going to subOSes in the same machine will be intercepted
on the network layer and transferred to the destination subOS.
We achieve high bandwidth by adopting a lockless buffer ring
and decreasing notification overhead using NAPI interfaces.
When the number of PCI-passthrough devices is insuf-
ficient for all subOSes, such as RAID controllers, Rain-
Forest adopts the splitting driver model applied in para-
virtualization technologies. We base the network virtualiza-
tion on the universal TUN/TAP device driver [60] (RFtun),
and the filesystem virtualization on FUSE [91] (RFfuse). To
gain better performance isolation and access control, we at-
tach all back-end threads into a control group created specifi-
cally for each subOS. Under the control group, resource con-
sumptions of the back-end drivers can be accounted.
5.5. State Sharing among the supervisor and subOSes
Except for the mutually shared states in the private communi-
cation channels between two subOSes, the supervisor shares
few states with all subOSes.
First, the supervisor manages a few globally-shared states
that are publicly available to all subOSes. These states in-
clude the communication-core list, which is used for IPIs in
FICM, and the MAC list, which is used to sniffer packets
in RFLoop. The communication-core list is modified if the
CPUs of a subOS change or a different load balancing algo-
rithm is adopted for FICM. The MAC list is modified when
a subOS is created or destroyed. As these updates are usu-
ally infrequent, state sharing can be implemented via either
shared memory or messages.
Second, the supervisor reserves privileged operations on
the protected resources that can not be modified by a subOS.
Typical examples include the low memory, the I/O APIC, and
the PCIe configuration registers, as discussed in Section 5.3.
5.6. Refactoring Efforts
Most of the Linux software stack is unmodified to support the
existing Linux ABI. Table 3 summarizes the new and modi-
fied lines of code in RainForest, most of which are performed
in the portable functions and independent modules. Out of
the key effort in the kernel change, the largest portions are
FICM and the functionalities of the supervisor, which can be
dynamically activated or deactivated.
Table 3: The effort of building RainForest on the basis of a
Linux 2.6.32 kernel.
Component Number of Lines
The supervisor 994
The RFcontroller module 1837
A subOS 1969
FICM / RFcom / subOScon 1438 / 1522 / 1331
RFloop / RFtun / RFfuse 752 / 2339 / 980
others (rfm) 4789
6. Evaluation
RainForest currently runs well on x86-64 platforms (i.e., Intel
Xeon E5620, E5645, E5-2620, E5-2640, and E7-8870). We
run the benchmarks on the two servers listed in Table 2. In
fact, we have tested two benchmark suites (lmbench [89] and
PARSEC [18]) to demonstrate the zero overhead of utilizing
the IFTS OS model relative to the virtualization techniques of
LXC and Xen. The results are consistent with those reported
in [88] and we do not represent here. Other comprehensive
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Figure 6: The cumulative latency distribution of three mi-
crobenchmarks. The number on the system with the maximum
tail latency is not reported in each subFigure.
comparisons are performed on the three Linux kernels, LXC,
Xen and IX.
The special technologies including Intel Hyper-Threading,
Turbo Boost, and SpeedStep are disabled to ensure better fair-
ness. We build all the systems (Linux, containers in LXC,
Dom0 and DomU in Xen, and subOSes in RainForest) on
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 Service Pack 1, which is re-
leased with the 2.6.32 kernel. Using the original distribution,
we compile kernels 3.17.4, 4.9.40, and 2.6.35M so as to com-
pare with state-of-the-practice. The Linux and Xen versions
are 0.7.5 and 4.0.0, respectively. In this Section, we use OS
instance to denote a container of LXC, a DomU guest OS on
Xen, or a subOS in RainForest. For RainForest, as the opera-
tion overhead of the supervisor is negligible, we also deploy
applications on it in our experiments. This ensures the full
utilization of the machine resources. For LXC and Xen, we
bind each OS instance’s CPUs or virtual CPUs to physical
CPUs, which helps decrease the influence of process schedul-
ing. The NUMAmemory allocation policy is local allocation,
which preferably allocates local memory in the same node to
their CPUs accordingly. For the Linux kernels, we do not
pin the benchmarks on specific CPUs or specify the memory
allocation policies, making them compete for the system re-
sources without restriction. Since there are abundant ethernet
adapters in a single server, we make each OS instance directly
access one to get near-native performance. For the storage,
we attach each OS instance a directly accessed disk when de-
ploying two OS instances in a 12-core server, one under an
LSI SAS1068E SAS controller and the other under an Intel
ICH10 AHCI controller. When running four OS instances on
a S-B-type server, we adopt the tmpfs in-memory file systems
to reduce the contention for a single disk.
6.1. Understanding the root causes
As an application benchmark is about several orders of magni-
tude complex than a micro-benchmark, it is difficult to run ap-
plication benchmarks to understand the OS kernel behaviours.
In stead, we run the Will-It-Scale benchmark suite to inspect
the advantage of the IFTS architecture and uncover the root
causes mentioned in Section 3.3. We deploy six OS instances
on an S-A type server. Each OS instance runs a process and
the number of threads increases with the cores.
We deliberately only present the performance numbers of
three benchmarks: malloc,munmap, and open. Among them,
the malloc operations contend for the free list locks [70];
the munmap operations cause TLB shootdown to other
CPUs [96]; the open operations competes for both locks and
dentry cache [93]. Note that RainForest does not intend to
eliminate the causes (3) and (5) in Section 3.3, as well as
other systems.
Figure 6 shows the cumulative latency distribution of each
benchmark. The dotted vertical lines indicate the average la-
tencies. Except for open, RainForest exhibits the best perfor-
mance in terms of both the maximum latencies and standard
deviations. Excluding Linux-3.17.4 and Linux-4.9.40, we
also notice that RainForest exhibits lower tail latencies and
average latencies in all the benchmarks. For malloc, Linux-
4.9.40 has the lowest average latency, but it has higher maxi-
mum latency and standard deviation with respect to RainFor-
est. For open both Linux-3.17.4 and Linux-4.9.40 shows bet-
ter tail, average, and maximum latencies with respect to Rain-
Forest. Please note that RainForest is based on Linux 2.6.32,
and the performance improvement of Linux kernel evolution
is definitely helpful to RainForest.
6.2. Performance isolation
In this section, we use both micro benchmarks and applica-
tion benchmarks to measure (average or worst-case) perfor-
mance isolation of different systems on an S-A type server
with two OS instances.
6.2.1. Mixed microbenchmarks The micro benchmarks
we used include SPEC CPU 2006 [45] (CPU intensive),
cachebench [72] (memory intensive), netperf [52] (network
intensive), IOzone [1](filesystem I/O intensive). 11 bench-
marks from four benchmark suites are selected to exert heavy
pressures to different subsystems. We investigate the mutual
interference of any two benchmarks which are deployed in
two OS instances in a single server. The two OS instances,
each with 3 cores and 8 GB memory, run in the same NUMA
node rather in two NUMA nodes, producing more perfor-
mance interference. As the processes contend heavily on
accessing (especially writing) files on a disk in the IOzone
case, we make them read/write files in the tmpfs file system
to stress the filesystem caches and memory instead of physi-
cal disks. For cachebench, we set the footprint to be 32 MB,
which is greater than the LLC and makes more pressure on
the memory system. When running two netperf benchmarks
on Linux, each of them uses a NIC with an IP in different
networks.
Figure 7 reports the average performance degradation of
each foreground benchmark affected by the background one
with respect to solo running the foreground one. Rain-
Forest exhibits good performance isolation except for run-
ning cachebench.write and cachebench.modify benchmarks
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as backgrounds. LXC and Xen have heavier performance in-
terference in the same two scenarios, and the performance
is degraded much in the other scenarios. Besides, differ-
ent Linux kernels show similar behaviors (only report Linux-
3.17.4), indicating the performance isolation is poor in an
SFTI OS architecture as it shares many data structures pro-
tected by locks.
6.2.2. Improving worst-case performance In this sec-
tion, we test and verify RainForest’s ability of improving
the worst-case performance and resource utilization. The
latency-critical workload we choose is Search from Big-
DataBench [98]. The front-end Tomcat server distributes
each request from the clients to all back-end servers, merges
the records received from the back ends, and finally responds
to the clients. Tomcat is not the bottleneck according to our
massive tests. In the experiments, we choose the real work-
load trace and set the distribution to be uniform—sending re-
quests at a uniform rate.
When running a single Search workload, we found the tail
latency dramatically climbs up to seconds when the request
rate reaches 400 req/s, while the CPU utilization rate can-
not surpass 50%. So we set up two Search backends on two
OS instances on the same server, each with 6 cores and 16
GB memory. Figure 8 illustrates the tail latencies with in-
creasing load levels. For three Linux kernels, we only show
Linux-2.6.35M as it exhibits better worst-case performance.
When the load level increases to 400 requests/s, the tail la-
tencies on LXC and Xen deteriorate significantly. The tail
latencies are beyond 200 ms except for RainForest. Linux
still keeps tail latency below 200 ms owing to free schedul-
ing across all 12 cores, but the tail latency gets much worse
after 450 requests/s, indicating aggressive resource sharing
will produce more interference. If we demand the endurable
limit of the tail latency is 200ms, the maximum throughput
of Linux 2.6.35M, LXC, Xen, and RainForest is around 400,
350, 350, 500 request/s, respectively. On these load levels,
the CPU utilization is 59.8%, 58.0%, 55.7%, and 69.7%, re-
spectively. Although the CPU utilization of Linux can finally
reach to ∼90% at 600 req/s, the tail latency becomes totally
unacceptable.
6.2.3. Services mixed with offline workloads
Co-running online services and offline batches is always a
thorny problem. We investigate RainForest’s performance
isolation in terms of co-running Search with batch workloads.
In this test, each OS instance runs on 6 cores and 16 GBmem-
ory within a NUMA node. We run Search and a PARSEC
workload on each OS instance, respectively. The baseline
is solo running Search on one OS instance of each system.
The requests are replayed in a uniform distribution at 300 re-
quests/s, beyond which the Search tail latency on Xen will
deteriorate dramatically.
Figure 9 illustrates the performance degradation of the
Search tail latency with respect to the baseline. As shown in
Figure 8, Xen has the poorest tail latency performance (210.9
Table 4: Overhead of adjusting three systems (in seconds).
Configuration 6 CPUs, 16G RAM 1 CPU 512M RAM
Operations create destroy online offline online offline
LXC 2.1 0 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Xen 14.2 5.9 0.126 0.127 0.167 0.166
RainForest 6.1 0 0.066 0.054 0.020 0.060
Table 5: Performance of consolidating Search and PARSEC
benchmarks. We identify requests invalid if the response time
> 1 second and exclude them from the throughput.
PARSEC batch Search
Platform running time 99%th tail throughput
Units seconds ms req/s
Linux-2.6.32 1058.7 379.3 217.1
Linux-2.6.35M 1136.5 371.4 217.9
Linux-3.17.4 1054.4 410.8 219.1
LXC 1716.8 284.1 214.0
Xen 4731.0 305.4 209.4
RainForest 1520.0 230.2 214.4
ms) when running Search at 300 req/s. Actually, even at 250
req/s, its tail latency is high as 150.6 ms, worse than LXC and
RainForest, and the average slowdown reaches up to 25.6%.
As the virtualization overhead exists, Xen is not suited for a
high load level when the tail latency matters, and its perfor-
mance is worse than LXC.
RainForest exhibits good performance isolation almost in
all the cases, while the other systems get larger tail laten-
cies in many cases. The slowdown of tail latency in Rain-
Forest is always less than 8%, while that of LXC is high as
46%. If we only care about the average performance of of-
fline batches [10], Xen gains better performance than Linux.
But unfortunately, in this case, the tail latency of Search dete-
riorates worse, which is totally unacceptable.
6.3. Flexibility of resource sharing
In this section, we evaluate the overhead and agility of adjust-
ing resources when consolidating Search with varying other
workloads.
6.3.1. Evaluating elasticity overhead
We evaluate the overhead of creating, destroying, and resizing
the OS instance by performing these operations 100 times on
an S-A type server. For two OS instance configurations, Ta-
ble 4 lists the overheads on LXC, Xen, and RainForest.
From the experimental results, we can find that the elas-
ticity of these systems can be overall described as LXC >
RainForest > Xen. For LXC, allocating and deallocating re-
sources are not really conducted on physical resources but
performed by updating the filter parameters of the cgroup sub-
system. Although an adjustment operation is always quickly
responded, it may take a long time to take effect. For Xen,
the adjusting phase is also longer. Besides getting emulated
resources ready before loading a domU kernel, VMM needs
to prepare several software facilities, including setting up
shadow page tables, shared pages, communication channels,
etc.
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Figure 7: Performance degradation of co-running two benchmarks on a single server. Numbers 0∼10 on the both x- and y- axes
denotes SPECCPU.{bzip2, sphix3}, cachebench.{read, write, modify}, IOzone.{write, read, modify}, netperf.{tcp_stream, tcp_rr,
tcp_crr}, respectively. The numbers in the grid are the average performance slow down percentages (%) when a foreground
benchmark on y-axis interfered by a background one on x-axis relative to solo-running a foreground one.
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Figure 8: Tail latency of Search running on two OS instances
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Figure 9: Tail latency slowdown of Search when co-locating
with Parsec benchmarks relative to solo running. The Search
tail latency when solo running at 300 req/s on LXC, Xen, and
RainForest is 129.3, 210.9, and 128.5 ms, respectively. The per-
formance numbers of Linux kernels are shown in Figure 3b.
6.3.2. Agile changes to dynamic workloads
Here we evaluate the agility of the three systems to fast-
changing workloads. We initially configure the server with
two OS instances as in Section 6.2.3. But the request rate is
fluctuated according to the original distribution. We package
13 PARSEC benchmarks into a batch job and run it repeat-
edly in one OS instance while Search runs in the other OS
instance. Meanwhile, a simple scheduler is adopted to ad-
just the resources of the two OS instances to reduce the tail
latency of Search. In this test, we only adjust the CPUs of
two OS instances rather than finding the optimal strategy of
adjusting all resources, which is an open issue. We set two
thresholds (lt,ut) to bound the tail latency. That is if the tail
latency of the last 10 seconds is above the upper threshold—
ut, a CPU will be transferred from the PARSEC OS instance
to the other, and vice versa.
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Figure 10: Search tail latency varies with time. The threshold
(lt,ut) is (160, 200). For Linux, only Linux 2.6.35M is shown as
it gains better performance than Linux 2.6.32 and Linux 3.17.4.
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Figure 11: The varying number of the CPU owned by the OS
instance running Search v.s. time. The tail latency threshold
(lt,ut) is set to be (160, 200).
We record the CPU adjustment events and tail latency vari-
ations throughout the replay of 482400 requests in 37.5 min-
utes. From Figure 10, we observe that both Linux and LXC
have large fluctuations, showing unstable worst-case perfor-
mance. Xen has smaller fluctuations but the tail latency even
exceeds 500 ms. Relatively, RainForest exhibits the most
stable worst-case performance, mostly between 200 ms and
300 ms. Meanwhile, after replaying all the requests, the num-
ber of PARSEC benchmarks finished on Linux-2.6.32, Linux-
2.6.35M, Linux-3.17.4, LXC, Xen, and RainForest is 22, 26,
25, 19, 6, and 20, respectively. Xen finished less PARSEC
benchmarks because the tail latency cannot be reduced to be-
low 200 ms even 11 cores are occupied. RainForest outper-
forms the other systems in terms of both the worst-case per-
formance of Search and the average performance of the batch
jobs in terms of running time. Figure 11 records the varying
number of the processors owned by the OS instance when run-
ning Search. In Linux, Search and PARSEC workloads com-
pete for resources adversely and we do not report the number
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Figure 12: Scalability in terms of tail latency running mem-
cached on different systems.
in Figure 11.
Table 5 reports the running time of the PARSEC batch jobs
and the corresponding performance of Search on each system.
The Search throughput on each system does not differ signif-
icantly, while the 99% tail latencies are quite different. In
RainForest, the tail latency is the lowest (230.2 ms) and the
batch job runs faster (1520.0 seconds) than LXC and Xen. In-
terestingly, we also observe Linux 3.17.4 gains the best aver-
age performance in terms of the running time of the PARSEC
benchmarks and the Search throughput, however, its tail la-
tency is the worst (high as 410.8). It again confirms that the
SFTI OS architecture is optimized toward the average perfor-
mance. We do not test Linux 4.9.40 because of time limitation
in the rest of experiments.
6.4. Scalability
We initiate four OS instances for LXC, Xen, and RainForest
on a S-B type server. Each OS instance has 10 cores and
250GB RAM, among which 50GB is used for the tmpfs file
system.
6.4.1. Scalability in terms of worst-case performance
We use an in-memory key-value store (memcached) to evalu-
ate the scalability in terms of the tail latency. The memcached
benchmark we use is a variant of that in MOSBench [20].
Similar to the method in Section 3, we run multiple mem-
cached servers in Linux, each on its own port and being bound
to a dedicated core. For the other systems, the requests are
sent averagely into four OS instances. We profile the lookup
time of all requests and present the tail latencies with increas-
ing cores in Figure 12. Although the scalability problem still
exists, the tail latency on RainForest increases slowly than the
others. When the core number is 40, the tail latency improve-
ments of RainForest in comparison with Linux 2.6.32, Linux
2.6.35M, Linux 3.17.4, LXC, and Xen are 7.8x, 4.2x, 2.0x,
1.3x, and 1.4x, respectively. Among the three Linux kernels,
Linux 2.6.35M gets the highest throughput. RainForest gains
the highest throughput among the six systems.
6.4.2. The average performance
On Linux, we use the "standalone" deploy mode with the 4
worker instances on LXC, Xen, and RainForest (each OS in-
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Figure 13: Spark workloads performance.
stance runs a worker instance). The Spark [100] workloads
include OLAP SQL queries (Select, Aggregation, and Join)
from [98, 78] and offline analytic algorithms (Kmeans and
PageRank).
Figure 13 shows their performance on the systems, includ-
ing RainForest with RFloop enabled. Although the band-
width limit of the memory controllers and peripherals may
be bottlenecks, we also get much improvement from RainFor-
est. The maximum speedup is 1.43x, 1.16x, and 1.78x com-
pared to Linux, LXC, and Xen, respectively. With RFloop
enabled, the maximum speedup is 1.71x, 1.69x, and 2.60x,
respectively. For Join and Aggregation, the time consumed
in data shuffling among Spark workers takes a high propor-
tion out of the whole execution. RFloop facilitates them with
fast communication channels. Using netperf, the TCP stream
performance of RFloop is 0.63x of the local loop, 1.47x of
a virtual NIC of Xen, and 15.95x of a physical NIC. For the
UDP stream test, the speedup is 0.44x, 13.02x, and 4.34x, re-
spectively.
As many workloads still benefit from shared memory, the
number of OS instances where the application is distributed
influences the performance. We tested Select, Aggregation,
and Join on 2, 4, 6, and 8 subOSes using the same server.
We find that the optimal subOS number is four for Select and
Aggregation, while for Join eight subOSes gets the best per-
formance (the improvement can achieve 170%).
7. Experience and Limitations
RainForest is a concrete implementation of our model. How-
ever, it is only a point in the implementation space.
First, implementing a subOS as a Linux-like OS instance
is not required by the model. However, it is commercially
significant [7] for DC workloads.
Second, we have compared RainForest with Barrelfish us-
ing the munmap microbenchmark (we failed to run appli-
cation benchmarks). Barrelfish shows good scalability con-
sistent with [14]. But with increasing memory size to be
unmapped, the average and tail latencies deteriorate signifi-
cantly. The reason might reside in the two-phase commit pro-
tocol, used to ensure global consistence. In this case, the mes-
sage passing system needs to queue large amount of messages
caused by splitted unmap operations, indicating the potential
bottleneck for the message passing approach.
Third, as the supervisor and subOSes run at the same priv-
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ileged level, our architecture can be easily extended to mul-
tiple coherence domains that have no hardware cache coher-
ence. However, its flexibility of resource sharing will be lim-
ited and we can only elastically partition resources within
a domain, or else we have to leverage the DSM technology
among several domains in [65].
Finally, the number of subOSes is strictly limited by the
cores or SMT threads, but we can integrate containers or
guest OSes in a subOS. Two-level scheduling is an interest-
ing open issue. When the peripheral devices are not enough
or sharing them may not significantly slow down the appli-
cation performance on other subOSes, we can leverage the
virtualization technology like the split-driver model [24, 66].
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose an IFTS OS model, and explore the
space of applying the IFTS OS model to a concrete OS imple-
mentation: RainForest, which is fully compatible with Linux
ABI. Our comprehensive evaluations demonstrate RainForest
outperforms Linux with four kernels, LXC, and Xen in terms
of worst-case and average performance most of time when
running a large number of benchmarks.
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